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Local spillovers and durable adoption: Evidence from durable 
consumptions in rural China 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The effects of social learning and network externalities in the diffusion of a new 
product imply that there should be local spillovers from existing owners to new adopters in a 
closely-related community. Using the 1999 durable consumption survey data in rural China, 
this paper examines the importance of local spillovers in the diffusion of two major durable 
goods, washing machine and refrigerator. 
Design/methodology/approach – Based on an October 1999 survey of rural durable goods 
consumption conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, the authors 
examine the likelihood of rural households adopting a washing machine and a refrigerator 
during 1998-1999, respectively. 
Findings – The estimation results indicate that a household is more likely to buy its first 
durable good in villages where a large share of households already own one. Further evidence 
suggests that these patterns are unlikely to be explained by unobserved local characteristics. 
When examined in more detail, the extent of local spillovers appears to be positively related 
to household education level. 
Originality/value – Our study reveals the importance of local spillovers in the diffusion of 
these two durables. Specifically, 64% of washing machine adoptions starting at 1998 are due 
to the spillovers. For refrigerator adoptions, this percentage is 55%. Furthermore, as far as we 
know, our study is among the first to test and provide evidence on the interaction between 
education level and local spillovers based on the learning hypothesis.  
Keywords China, Rural households, Local spillovers, Durable adoptions, Washing machine, 
Refrigerator, Education level 
JEL codes D12, L68, O33 
Paper type Research paper
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1. Introduction 
When a new product is introduced to the market, potential adopters are generally 
concerned with its performance and reliability. Because of these uncertainties, potential 
adopters may postpone their purchases. These uncertainties can be effectively reduced when 
potential adopters are able to observe their neighbors using this new product and to know 
how they evaluate it.
1
 On the other hand, network externalities may also contribute to these 
local spillovers. An increase in the number of users would lead to an increase in the value of 
a new product or lead to a development of its complementary service, thus stimulate its 
further adoption. Therefore, one should expect that there be local spillovers from existing 
owners to new adopters in a closely-related community. 
In this paper, we empirically examine the importance of these local spillovers in the 
diffusion of two durable goods, washing machine and refrigerator, in rural China. Our study 
has important implications for policy makers in China, who recently have been trying to 
stimulate domestic consumption with special attention to durable consumption in rural areas. 
Moreover, since a new technology may be materialized as a new product, the diffusion of 
these two durables may shed light on new technology adoptions which play a central role in 
the theories of development and economic growth (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). 
The situation of rural China in the late 90s provides a unique scenario to examine the 
diffusion of new products. For most rural households, their adoptions of electric appliances in 
the late 90s were the first purchases. By examining the likelihood of durable adoptions in 
rural China during 1998-1999, we find that households are more likely to buy their first 
washing machine (hereafter WM) or refrigerator in villages where a larger share of 
households already own one.  
However, these detected local spillovers may be attributed to the fact that households in 
the same village have some unobserved characteristics in common. Living in the same 
3 
 
economic and social environment, neighbors may develop similar consumption preferences. 
This problem is pervasive in the empirical studies on network effects.
2
 Thanks to the richness 
of the data, we are able to use additional control variables, including the ownership status of 
other 15 durables and their village ownership rates, and we also perform instrument variable 
(IV) estimations. We find little evidence that this positive relationship is the result of local 
common characteristics. Furthermore, this spillover effect is also economically significant. 
Our estimation indicates that 64% of WM adoptions starting at 1998 is due to the spillovers; 
for refrigerator adoptions, this percentage is 55%. 
Local spillovers and education level have been documented individually to stimulate 
new technology adoptions.
3
 However, there is little evidence on how these two effects 
interact with each other. We examine their interaction effect on the likelihood of adopting 
these two durables, respectively. We find that the strength of local spillovers is positively 
related to a household’s education level – the better educated a household is, the more 
strongly the likelihood of its durable adoption is influenced by local ownership rates. This 
finding is consistent with the learning hypothesis in that more educated individuals are more 
capable learners. Therefore, they are more efficient to acquire information through learning 
from their neighbors and more capable to “receive, decode and understand” information 
around them (Schultz, 1975).  
As far as we know, our study is among the first to test and provide evidence on the 
interaction between education and local spillovers based on the learning hypothesis. Although 
what we study is on new durable adoptions, our results may shed light on new technology 
adoptions.
4
 Given a higher complexity of new technologies, it seems reasonable to expect 
that the extent of local spillovers should also associate with the education level.  
Our paper is closely related to the literature on network externalities
5
. Much of this 
evidence relates to technology adoption by firms, including electronic table (Church & 
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Gandal, 1992), digital-control machine (Karshenas & Stoneman, 1993), ATM (Saloner & 
Shepard, 1995), etc. In contrast, studies documenting network effects among consumers are 
few and far between. Among the few exceptions, Gandal (1994) shows that consumers were 
willing to pay a premium for spreadsheet software compatible with the Lotus platform and 
with external database programs; Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) report that people are more 
likely to buy their first home computer in areas where a high fraction of households already 
own computers; and Park (2004) finds that network externalities in video cassette recorders 
explain much of the dominance of VHS relative to Betamax. 
Our paper is also related to the literature on durable consumption in China. Hu, Li and 
Wei (1989) are among the first to quantitatively analyze durable goods consumption in China. 
Rong and Yao (2003) find that the improvement of public service provision stimulates the 
consumption of electric appliances in rural China. Gan, Yin and Zang (2010) investigate how 
the privatization of public housing in the 1990s influenced durable consumption in urban 
China. Ying and Du (2012) document that rural households with medical insurance are more 
likely to adopt durables. However, local spillovers in the diffusion of durables are rarely 
examined. One exception is Rong (2011). By examining the consumption of color television 
sets in rural China, Rong (2011) documents the existence of a type of local spillovers – free 
riding across neighbors, which reduces the adoption propensity of non-owners.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data. Section 3 reports 
empirical results. Section 4 concludes with policy implications. 
2. Data description 
 Data used in this paper mainly comes from an October 1999 survey of rural durable 
goods consumption conducted by the Rural Survey Organization (RSO), the National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS) of China. We also use data from the RSO’s regular annual household 
survey of 1998. The consumption survey covered over 20,000 households from all the 
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Chinese continental provinces except Tibet. They were drawn by a stratified random 
sampling method from the RSO regular survey frame of about 68,000 households. The 
purchases of 16 durables were investigated.
6
 We exclude from my sample the 0.7 percent of 
households with no power. Further removal of invalid observations leaves us with around 
18,000 households. 
Our focus is on two major durables, WM and refrigerator.
7
 We treat the purchases of 
these two durables in rural China during the late 1990s as first purchases rather than 
replacements. When China started its reform in the early 80s, these durables were scarce even 
in urban area. Most rural households did not begin their purchases until the 1990s. In the 
survey, 91% of households reported their WM purchases were within 10 years. This number 
was 96% for refrigerator. If the replacement cycle is around 10 years, assuming that these 
durable consumptions were first purchases seems reasonable.
8
  
(Table 1) 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics of these two durable consumptions, 
respectively. Since our estimations are restricted to villages with at least ten sample 
households, for consistency we impose the same restriction when calculating the summary 
statistics. Sample households thus reduce from around 18,000 to 12,000. Households are 
divided by their ownership status. For each durable, column (1) is for households who 
reported no adoption at the survey, and column (2) is for those who reported adoption since 
1998. For completeness, column (3) is for those households who reported adoption before 
1998. The population refers to the number of household members who are permanent 
residents (Changzhu Renkou). Average years of education, average age, and average net 
income all refer to those of permanent residents. Both durable consumptions share the 
following characteristics. Compared to non-owners, owners were better educated, and earned 
higher income. As expected, these owners also enjoyed lower electricity prices, more stable 
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power supply, and having tap water (for WM). Moreover, new adopters since 1998 faced a 
higher village ownership rate than non-owners. The statistic summary suggests that 
household characteristics, public services, and lagged ownership rates may influence the 
adoption of these durables. 
(Figure 1) 
Figure 1 shows the spot and estimated linear relationship between WM adoption rates 
since 1998 and the WM ownership rates in 1997 at the county level. For those counties with 
higher ownership rates in 1997, their later adoption rates are also higher. The OLS estimated 
coefficient is 0.29 (standard error is 0.03; t-value is 9.2.) This positive relationship also exists 
in refrigerator adoptions. 
3. Empirical results  
3.1. Empirical specification 
We analyze the local spillovers on durable diffusion using cross-sectional linear 
probability (LP) regressions of household purchases. We follow the convention in the 
literature on the demand for durable goods (e.g., Dubin and McFadden, 1984; Farrell, 1954) 
and treat the demand as a binary decision of buying or not. The extent of local spillovers is 
measured by the durable ownership rate at the village level since rural households interact 
with each other the most within a village. The estimation model is as follows. 
0
, 1 , 1 1 , 1 2 ,( 1) % ( 1998)
u
i t t i t i t i tProb y village x x u t          ,           (1) 
where ,( 1)i tProb y   is the likelihood of purchasing since year t for household i; 1%tvillage  is 
the village ownership rate at the end of year 1t  .9  Take WM adoptions for example. We 
examine the likelihood of WM adoption during the period starting at 1998 and lasting until 
the time of the survey. The dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one if a 
household purchased a WM during this period, and zero otherwise. If there are local 
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spillovers, with control for all other factors, the likelihood of non-owners to buy a WM, 
,( 1)i tProb y  , should be higher ( 0  ) in villages with higher ownership rates, 1%tvillage  . 
In equation (1), 0
ix  is the vector of observed household and village characteristics. 
Household characteristics include net income per capita, average years of education, average 
age, family size and male ratio. Village characteristics include stability of the power supply 
(stable=1), access to tap water (yes=1), electricity price, and location (town, suburban village 
or rural village). uix  represents the unobserved characteristics, which are correlated with 
1%tvillage  , but not with 
0
ix . iu  are the other unobserved characteristics, including those 
correlated with 0ix . 
Unobserved characteristics in uix  may lead to estimation bias. If 1%tvillage   is 
positively correlated with uix , its coefficient  would be overestimated. People in coastal area 
are more inclined to accept new things and ideas. Even though they may not have a WM at 
the moment, their propensity to adopt one is still higher. The failure to control for this 
common propensity would spuriously make the estimated local spillover larger. On the other 
hand, if 1%tvillage   is negatively correlated with 
u
ix because of survivor bias, its coefficient 
would be underestimated. In either case, we should need instrument variables. 
3.2. Baseline estimation result 
We report in column (1) of Table 2 the baseline regression on the likelihood of WM 
adoption since 1998. Some villages have fewer than ten sample households in the dataset, and 
one might be concerned that the sample village ownership rates are imprecise estimates of 
their population means. To reduce this measurement error, we restrict my sample to villages 
with at least ten observations.
10
 Since the ownership rates vary only at the village level, the 
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standard errors are corrected to allow for group effects within villages. County dummies are 
included to control for common unobservables at the county level. 
As shown in table 2, most estimates of household characteristics are significant at the 
1% level, with signs consistent with expectations. Higher income, greater average education 
and higher population increase a household’s likelihood to adopt a WM. The effect of the 
male ratio is positive, indicating a household with more male has a higher propensity to 
purchase a WM. It sounds reasonable given that clothes were hand-washed by the female in 
general. The positive effect of income is as expected. Higher educational levels have two 
effects. First, people with more education tend to have a higher desire for a modern life style. 
Second, more education implies easier adaptation to new technologies. More family members 
reduce the cost per capita by sharing a WM, which increases the household’s willingness to 
buy. 
 (Table 2) 
The estimated coefficient on 1%tvillage   is 0.15, significant at the 1% level. This 
implies that, controlling for household characteristics and public service provisions, for a 
household in a village with 10% higher WM ownership in 1997, the probability of making a 
purchase since 1998 would increase by 1.5%.   
We also expect local spillovers exist in the diffusion of refrigerator. Column (2) reports 
the estimation result on the likelihood of refrigerator adoption since 1998. The estimated 
coefficient on 
1%tvillage   is 0.20, significant at the 1% level, indicating that local spillovers 
persist in the diffusions of both durables. 
We use the hazard function to primarily evaluate the contribution of local spillovers to 
the speed of durable diffusion. We use WM adoptions to demonstrate. Summing up equation 
(1) in both sides at the village level leads to  
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，    (2) 
in which ctf  is the WM adoption rate of village c starting at year t, , 1c tF   is the WM 
ownership rate in village c in year 1t  . 
, 11
ct
c t
f
F 
 therefore represents the hazard rate of WM 
adoption since year t. Using the information in Table 1, we are able to calculate the adoption 
hazard since 1998, which turns out to be 4.55% (=470/(470+9754)). That is, among every 
100 households who did not own a WM before 1998, on average 4.55 households adopted 
one since 1998 till the survey time. The ownership rate that a non-owner faced in 1997 is 
19.56% on average. From column (1) of Table 2, we have 0.15  , thus , 1* c tF  =2.91%. 
That is, the local spillovers contribute 2.91% to the hazard rate 4.55%, o u
c cx x   contributes 
the rest 1.64%. If   accurately measures the spillovers, 64% (2.91% over 4.55%) of WM 
adoption starting at 1998 is due to the spillovers. Similarly, we find that 55% of refrigerator 
adoption starting at 1998 is due to the spillovers. 
To address the concern that the LP specification might potentially distort the estimation 
results (Long, 1997), suppose that the true model is a logit. By using a LP model instead, the 
ownership rate might be a proxy for the non-linear terms of other control variables, thus 
generating spurious coefficients. We estimate the probit and logit models, respectively. The 
estimated coefficient on  1%tvillage   
persists significantly positive though the number of 
observations becomes smaller. We also repeat the regressions with county dummies replaced 
by province dummies. For all the three specifications, the effect of 1%tvillage   persists 
significantly positive while the number of observations remains the same.
11
 
3.3. Estimation bias 
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An alternative explanation why the estimated coefficient on 
1%tvillage   is positive is that 
1%tvillage  is correlated with some unobserved common characteristics. First, living in the 
same economic and social environment, neighbors may develop similar consumption 
preferences. Second, higher ownership rates may be due to lower local price or well-
developed local services. These factors would also imply that those who did not purchase 
would have a higher propensity to buy in the later time. We now use proxies and instrument 
variables to deal with these unobservables. 
3.3.1. Control for unobservables 
If the positive coefficient on 
1%tvillage   is from the unobserved propensity to accept new 
stuff instead of local spillovers, adding variables that are correlated with an individual’s 
propensity should reduce the coefficient on 
1%tvillage  . We add three interactions of the 
household characteristics (net income per capita*average years of education, net income per 
capita*average age, average years of education*average age) and 15 dummies for ownership 
of other durables at the end of 1997. We also add ownership rates of these 15 durables in 
1997 to capture the average propensity of households to adopt durables at the village level. It 
is well known that it is hard to well control for income effects. Including the ownership status 
of other durables should also help in this aspect. 
(Table 3) 
Table 3 reports the estimation results on the likelihood of WM and refrigerator adoption, 
respectively. For reference, column (1) replicates the baseline estimation results in Table 2. 
The additional ownership rates are calculated based on the ownership status of each 
household within a village. To mitigate the colinearity, we first use family ownership status 
and ownership rates separately, and then we pool them together. Column (2) of Table 3 adds 
three interactions and 15 ownership status dummies; column (3) adds three interactions and 
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15 ownership rates; column (4) brings in all controls. For WM, the change in the coefficient 
on 
1%tvillage   is negligible; for refrigerator, there is a slight drop in the coefficient; in both 
case, the coefficient persists significantly positive. These make us more confident that the 
estimated coefficient on 
1%tvillage   does not merely reflect its correlation with local 
unobservables. 
3.3.2. Instrument variables   
Our next strategy for dealing with unobservables is to use instrument variables. 
Instrument variables must be relevant (correlated with the village ownership rate) and valid 
(uncorrelated with the household's unobservables). Local spillovers imply that, conditional on 
its characteristics, a household should be more likely to buy its first durable if it is surrounded 
by households with characteristics favoring this durable ownership. For example, a low-
educated household surrounded by high-educated households should be more likely to 
purchase than a low-educated household surrounded by low-educated households. Thus, 
village means as instrument variables should be relevant. We use five village means (average 
net income, average years of education, average age, population, male ratio) as instruments. 
But are these village means ( 0cx ) valid, that is, are they uncorrelated with household 
unobservables ( uix )? Note that 
0
cx  is orthogonal to 
u
ix  by definition. 
u
ix  was defined as those 
unobserved characteristics that are correlated with 1%tvillage   conditional on a household's 
observed characteristics. The part of the unobservables correlated with a household's 
observables was included in the error term, iu . Since observables are included in the 
regressions, correlation between unobservables and observables would bias the coefficients 
on these observables, but not the coefficient on 1%tvillage  . For example, the coefficient on 
the education level should incorporate any correlation between a household's tendency to 
accept new stuff and its education level. For this reason, village means would not be 
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correlated with u
ix . Case and Katz (1991) develop this insight in their study on the effects of 
neighborhood peers on the behaviors of inner-city youths. Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) 
apply this approach to examine the importance of local spillovers in the diffusion of home 
computers. Duflo and Saez (2002) also use this strategy when they examine individuals’ 
decisions about whether to enroll in a university-sponsored retirement plan. Admittedly, this 
instrument may still be invalid if there is a correlation between village means and the 
household’s unobserved propensity to adopt a new product even after controlling for its 
family characteristics. 
(Table 4) 
Although the above discussion suggests potential gains from IV estimations, we need to 
check the validity and quality of the instruments. First, the endogeneity test of Hausman 
(1978) is conducted by examining whether the OLS estimates are different from IV estimates. 
Because the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test uses the device of augmented regressors, it produces a 
robust F-statistic (Davidson, 2000). As shown in Table 4, for refrigerator adoptions the F-
statistics indicate that IV  estimates are significantly different from OLS estimates at the ten 
percent level. In contrast, for WM adoptions this difference is insignificant, indicating mis-
specification might not be a concern when OLS estimations are used. Second, we conduct the 
overidentification test (Ruud, 2000) to examine whether the orthogonality condition between 
the instruments and the error term holds. The Sargan chi-square statistics for this test are 
presented in Table 4. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the orthogonality condition 
holds, except for the situation when five village means are used as instruments in the 
estimation of refrigerator adoptions. In this case, we take cautions when using these five 
village means as instruments. Third, we perform the weak instrument test to determine 
whether the instruments are sufficiently correlated with the endogenous regressor. Stock and 
Yogo (2005) propose the test statistic, which is the F-statistic for joint significance of 
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instruments in the first-stage regression. As shown in Table 4, the F-statistic for each case 
indicates that our instruments are strong.
12
 
Table 4 reports the instrument estimation results for WM and refrigerator adoption, 
respectively. For reference, column (1) replicates the baseline estimation results in Table 2. In 
column (2), we include all five village means as instruments. In column (3), we drop the 
village mean population and male ratio from the instrument set. In column (4), we only 
include the village means of average net income and average years of education in the 
instrument set. According to the literature, village means of variables are calculated based on 
sample households in the village, with the examined household excluded. 
For WM adoption, the estimated coefficient on 
1%tvillage   becomes larger whereas the 
significance turns marginal (still significant at the 20% level). For refrigerator, the magnitude 
of the coefficient rises by three times, and the significance persists. This increase when using 
instruments may be due to survivor bias (Heckman and Singer, 1985). For example, the only 
household who does not own a WM given that everyone else in its village has owned one 
actually hates WM. This would lead to a downward bias in the baseline regression. With 
instrument, this survivor bias is avoided, thus the estimated coefficient on 
1%tvillage   
increases. It is unclear why this survivor bias does not influence the IV estimation of WM 
adoption in the similar way. To summarize, for WM and refrigerator adoptions, the results of 
instrument estimations indicate that unobservables are unlikely the main reason of getting the 
positive estimated coefficient on 
1%tvillage  . 
3.4. The interaction between education and local spillovers 
Would the education level make a difference on these local spillovers? Generally 
speaking, people with higher education level have higher learning capabilities. Therefore, 
based on the learning hypothesis, we should expect that households with higher education 
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level should be more efficient to learn from their neighbors and more capable to “receive, 
decode and understand” information around them, thus more likely to react to this spillover.13 
To test this implication, we add the interaction term “
1%tvillage  * average years of 
education” to the baseline regression and expect its coefficient to be positive. Doing so 
enables us to add village dummies.  
(Table 5) 
In column (1) of Table 5, we run the regression of WM adoption. The estimated 
coefficient on “
1%tvillage  * average years of education” is 0.026, significant at the 1% level. 
This indicates that households with higher education level are more strongly influenced by 
WM ownership rates. In column (4), we run the similar regression for refrigerator adoption. 
The interaction effect persists significantly positive.  
For robustness check, we use another measure of education to replace average education 
years. It is the schooling of the household head. In the survey, the education status of the 
household head can take five different values. Level 1 corresponds to illiterate, level 2 to 
primary school, level 3 to junior high school, level 4 to senior high school and level 5 to 
higher education. Schooling is defined as the school years of the household head. Using the 
terminology of China's education system, illiterate corresponds to 0 years in school, primary 
school to 6 years in school, junior high school to 9 years in school, senior high school to 12 
years in school, and higher education to 14 years in school. We repeat the regressions and 
report them in columns (2) and (5) of Table 5. The major results persist. Therefore, we 
further confirm that the interaction effect of education and learning capabilities on local 
spillovers in the diffusions of these two durables. 
The education effects on local spillovers may be non-linear. For example, it may be the 
case that literacy is essential to learn from neighbors; once above this level, additional 
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education makes little contribution. To test this non-linearity, we replace the education 
measure by dummies indicating a household head is at certain education level. The default is 
illiterate. With the inclusion of 4 dummies and their interactions with 
1%tvillage  , we repeat 
the estimations in columns (3) and (6). In general, the estimated coefficient on each 
interaction is significantly positive, indicating that households with higher education are 
influenced more strongly by local spillovers, compared to a typical illiterate household. 
However, we don’t observe the pattern that the coefficients on interactions increase over 
education below the associate degree. This confirms our non-linear concern. More 
specifically, once the literacy capability is developed, further schooling below the associate 
degree makes little difference on the efficiency in this type of learning. The head holding an 
associate or above degree makes the likelihood of adoption more strongly influenced by local 
spillovers, compared to other lower education level. It seems that having the associate degree 
or above makes individual more capable to capture changes around them and more adaptive 
to follow the new trend. Since collages are located in cities, we speculate that the experience 
living in cities may help in this aspect. 
4. Conclusions 
Using the 1999 durable consumption survey data in rural China, we examined the 
importance of the role of local spillovers – including learning and network externalities – in 
durable consumption. We further found that the extent of local spillovers is positively related 
to the education level of households, indicating individual’s learning ability influences the 
extent of local spillovers. 
As far as policy implications are concerned, the effect of public policies would be 
amplified by the local spillovers. This phenomenon is called the “social multiplier” by Becker 
and Murphy (2000). Not long ago, the Chinese government launched a series of subsidy 
policies to stimulate domestic, especially rural, consumption on durables. Such policies 
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include “bringing electric appliances into rural families (jiadian xiaxiang)”, “bringing 
construction material into rural families (jiancai xiaxiang)”, and subsidizing the energy 
efficient electric appliances. The existence of local spillovers implies that these subsidies 
would not only stimulate those who do purchase, they would also stimulate the adoption of 
potential consumers indirectly. Even after the termination of these policies, their stimulating 
effects will last for a long time because of the local spillover. Specifically, our research 
indicates that these local spillovers should be stronger in the diffusion of new products. 
Therefore, for electric appliances that are popular and the adoptions of which are mainly 
replacements, the subsidy policy would be less influential. In contrast, it would be more 
influential for the appliances that are less popular in rural area, such as air conditioner, 
computer, and car. Moreover, due to regional income inequality, the ownership rates vary 
across rural China. It is possible that the adoptions of some durables are mainly replacements 
in a rich region while they are mostly first-time adoptions in a poor region. Our finding 
suggests that the subsidy policy would be more effective in poor regions. An additional 
reason for this effectiveness could be that poorer households are more sensitive to the price 
change due to the subsidy. 
Though our study is on durable adoptions, the interaction effect between education and 
local spillovers, especially social learning, with respect to new technology adoption would be 
a promising direction for empirical research. A poor country can accelerate its catch-up by 
adopting new technologies developed in rich countries more quickly if the spillovers are 
stronger. Though it is unclear what the mechanism would be to induce the spillovers, social 
learning is a possible candidate.
14
 It is likely that schooling may augment the social learning, 
thus accelerating the catching-up process of a poor country.  
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Notes 
1
 Evidence on the learning effect has been documented among new technology and product diffusions. In his 
pioneering study on the diffusion of hybrid corn in the U.S., Griliches (1957) finds evidence consistent with 
later adopters learning from early adopters. Foster and Roserzweig (1995) and Conley and Udry (2001) find that 
farmers learn from each other about new technologies, especially the knowledge on detergent use associated 
with the new breed. Munshi (1996) finds that the network effect on new technology diffusion is due to social 
learning. Using a unique dataset on sunflower adoption in Mozambique, Bandiera and Rasul (2006) document 
that, consistent with information sharing, the network effect is stronger among farmers who report discussing 
agriculture with others. There is also evidence from the empirical study in health economics, labor economics 
and industrial organization. By examining several competing antiulcer drugs, Berndt, Pindych and Azoylary 
(2003) find that the network effect due to information dispersion influences consumer’s choice and evaluation. 
Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000) find that information sharing influences individual participation on 
social welfare projects. Irwin and Klenow (1994) document the learning effect in semi-product industry. 
Thornton and Thompson (1998) examine the knowledge spillover in the ship building industry during the WWII. 
2
 See Manski (1993). 
3
 Both effects are also detected in our study. For education effects, Abdulai and Huffman (2005) find that the 
likelihood of a farmer in Tanzania to adopt hybrid cow technology depended positively on his education level. 
Lin (1991) finds similar results for the diffusion of hybrid rice in China. Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) show 
that whether any family member has primary education is an important predictor of a household’s new farming 
technology adoption. Zhang et al. (2002) find eduction plays an important role in facilitating the diffusion of 
high-yielding varieties of seeds in India. By examining the adoption of four new technologies, hybrid corn, beta-
blockers, tractors, and computers, across states in the U.S., Skinner and Staiger (2005) find that education and 
social networks are the only variables that are significant to explain the adoption rates for all these four 
innovations.  
4
 It seems reasonable to make this extension. A new technology may be materialized as a new product, such as 
computer, ATM, software, and etc. Especially, a WM may be looked upon as a new technology to replace 
manual clothes-washing. With its adoption, the labor involved in washing clothes can be allocated to other 
production tasks. 
5
Network externalities can be divided into two types, direct and indirect network externalities (Farrell and 
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Saloner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985). The former is due to that the rise of user size leads to higher utility for 
each individual user, such as telecommunication network. The later refers to the situation that the user scale 
helps reduce the average cost of providing complementary goods, such as CTV repair services. This cost 
reduction would increase the user’s net benefit. 
6
 They were color television set (CTV), WM, refrigerator, black-white television set (BWTV), fan, radio 
recorder, camcorder, VCD player, camera, microwave, rice-cooker, air conditioner, pager, bicycle, automobile, 
and motorcycle. Special attentions were paid to the first three durables. 
7
 One may expect the adoption of CTV to be similar. It turns out the situation is more complicate with BWTV 
involved in (Rong, 2011).  
8
 Owning more than one durable was minor. They are excluded from our examination since we only have the 
information on the year of their latest adoption. For this reason, 13 valid observations are deleted when we 
examine WM adoptions, and six are deleted for refrigerator.  
9
 Using lagged, instead of contemporaneous, ownership rates to measure local spillovers helps to mitigate the 
identification problem raised by Manski (1993) as the reflection problem, i.e., while a household is influenced 
by its neighbors’ decisions, in turn, it influences their decisions as well. 
10
 We repeat the regressions with the sample of villages with at least 4 or 8 observations, respectively. The 
major results persist. 
11
 The related estimation results are available upon request from the authors. 
12
 Our tests closely follow Chen, Huffman and Rozelle (2011). 
13
 Rather than being a complementary good to learning from neighbors, the education level may be a substitute. 
Including learning from neighbors, there are other channels, such as reading books, to acquire related 
information. A person with higher education may have easier access to other channels, which makes him rely 
less on learning from neighbors. However, given the convenience (low cost) and the high efficiency of learning 
from neighbors, we expect that the substitution effect of education should be weak, thus its complementary 
effect should dominate. Moreover, with the presence of substitution effects, finding a positive relationship 
between the education level and local spillovers would be a support to the hypothesis that the complement 
effects did exist. 
14
 Lucas (1993) has realized the importance of social learning. He raises the following question and suggests to 
have it included in the growth theory, “Does learning accrue solely to the individual worker, manager, or 
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organization that does the producing, or is some of it readily appropriable by outside observers?” 
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Figure 1. Washing machine adoption rates since 1998 at the county level. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics by owners and non-owners. 
Variable Washing Machine Refrigerator 
 Non-
owner Adopter 
Non-
owner Adopter 
  Since  1998 Before 
1998 
 Since    1998 Before 
1998 
Village ownership rate in 1997  0.09   0.31   0.59   0.04   0.22   0.50  
 (0.17) (0.25) (0.26) (0.10) (0.24) (0.30) 
Average net income (1,000 yuan)  2.02   2.77   2.98   2.08   3.51   3.87  
 (1.42) (1.86) (2.03) (1.42) (2.39) (2.35) 
Average years of education  5.49   6.24   6.33   5.59   6.41   6.64  
 (1.93) (1.78) (1.83) (1.91) (1.80) (1.87) 
Average age (years) 32.1 32.8 32.5 31.9 33.5 34.7 
 (10.6) (8.8) (9.3) (10.3) (9.3) (9.7) 
Population  4.26   4.19   4.14   4.25   4.12   4.01  
 (1.23) (1.20) (1.19) (1.22) (1.28) (1.24) 
Fraction male  0.52   0.54   0.52   0.52   0.54   0.53  
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Education years of the head 8.16 8.59 8.80 8.26 8.56 8.77 
 (2.52) (2.26) (2.21) (2.48) (2.31) (2.30) 
Fraction illiterate, the head 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 
 (0.19) (0.14) (0.11) (0.18) (0.13) (0.12) 
Fraction elementary, the head  0.31 0.24 0.23 0.30 0.28 0.24 
 (0.46) (0.43) (0.42) (0.46) (0.45) (0.43) 
Fraction junior high, the head  0.51 0.58 0.57 0.53 0.53 0.54 
 (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Fraction senior high, the head  0.14 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.20 
 (0.34) (0.36) (0.38) (0.35) (0.38) (0.40) 
Fraction associate, the head  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) 
Electricity price (yuan/kWh)  0.79   0.69   0.63   0.77   0.66   0.60  
 (0.27) (0.21) (0.19) (0.26) (0.24) (0.2 ) 
Fraction in town  0.02   0.03   0.04   0.02   0.03   0.06  
Fraction in rural village  0.92   0.89   0.85   0.92   0.86   0.82  
Fraction with stable electricity  0.92   0.96   0.96   0.92   0.94   0.98  
Fraction with tap water 0.27 0.46 0.55    
Observations 9754 470 2486 11692 293 954 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 2 
LP estimations of the likelihood of durable adoptions since 1998. 
Variable 
Washing 
Machine 
Refrigerator 
（1） （2) 
1%tvillage   
0.149*** 0.201*** 
(0.030) (0.044) 
Average net income 
0.014*** 0.011*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Average years of education 
0.005*** 0.002** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Average age/100 
-0.029 -0.010 
(0.021) (0.014) 
Population 
0.009*** 0.008*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Fraction male 
0.018* 0.011 
(0.011) (0.008) 
Town dummy 
-0.001 0.003 
(0.020) (0.018) 
Rural village dummy 
-0.006 -0.002 
(0.014) (0.009) 
Electricity stability 
0.003 -0.006 
(0.007) (0.005) 
Electricity price 
0.000 -0.003 
(0.015) (0.007) 
Having tap water 
0.005   
(0.008)   
Observations 10214 11982 
Adjusted R
2
 0.105 0.113 
Note. *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent 
significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
County dummies are included. 
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Table 3 
LP estimations of adoption likelihood with more controls for unobservables. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Having other durables 
Baseline 
Y N Y 
Other durable ownership rates N Y Y 
Washing 
Machine 
1%tvillage   
0.149*** 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.152*** 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) 
Observations 10214 8825 9535 8825 
Adjusted R
2
 0.105 0.127 0.107 0.130 
Refrigerator 
1%tvillage   
0.201*** 0.184*** 0.158*** 0.171*** 
(0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) 
Observations 11982 10399 11171 10399 
Adjusted R
2
 0.113 0.114 0.109 0.114 
Note. *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively. County dummies are included. 
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Table 4 
IV estimations of adoption likelihood since 1998. 
    IV: Village means 
 
Baseline 
IV IV IV 
5 village means Deleting population 
and fraction male 
Deleting average age, 
population, and 
fraction mal 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
0.149*** 0.256 0.321 0.321 
Washing Machine (0.030) (0.187) (0.204) (0.204) 
    Observations 10214 10214 10214 10214 
Endogeneity test     
Durbin (score) chi2  0.73  (p = 0.393) 1.62  (p = 0.203) 1.62  (p = 0.203) 
Wu-Hausman F  0.71  (p = 0.398) 1.59  (p = 0.208) 1.59  (p = 0.208) 
Robust F  0.34  (p = 0.558) 0.75  (p = 0.388) 0.74  (p = 0.388) 
Overidentification test 
    
Sargan chi2 
 
2.71  (p = 0.607) 0.70  (p = 0.703) 0.70  (p = 0.406) 
Weak IV test 
    
Robust F 
 
5.19 7.25 10.88 
Stock-Yogo F 
 
36.96 53.21 79.82 
 
0.201*** 0.803** 0.947** 0.946** 
Refrigerator     (0.044) (0.386) (0.419) (0.419) 
    Observations 11982 11982 11982 11982 
Endogeneity test     
Durbin (score) chi2  15.23  (p = 0.000) 21.33  (p = 0.000) 21.31  (p = 0.000) 
Wu-Hausman F  14.96  (p = 0.000) 20.96  (p = 0.000) 20.95  (p = 0.000) 
Robust F  2.89  (p = 0.090) 3.86  (p = 0.050) 3.86  (p = 0.050) 
Overidentification test 
    
Sargan chi2 
 
11.56  (p = 0.021) 0.64  (p = 0.726) 0.46  (p = 0.498) 
Weak IV test 
    
Robust F 
 
2.61 3.62 5.41 
Stock-Yogo F 
 
38.07 57.89 86.84 
Note. *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. County dummies are included. 
1%tvillage 
1%tvillage 
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Table 5 
The interaction effects of education level and local spillovers on durable adoptions. 
Variable 
Washing Machine Refrigerator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1%tvillage   0.026***   0.043***   
*Average years of education (0.007)   (0.012)   
1%tvillage    0.018***   0.020***  
*Education years of the head  (0.005)   (0.007)  
1%tvillage     0.145***   0.319*** 
*Elementary dummy   (0.054)   (0.091) 
1%tvillage     0.174***   0.193** 
*Junior  high dummy   (0.056)   (0.075) 
1%tvillage     0.169**   0.247** 
*Senior  high dummy   (0.073)   (0.110) 
1%tvillage     0.899*   0.717* 
*Associate dummy   (0.461)   (0.372) 
Observations 10214 10214 10214 11982 11982 11982 
Adjusted R
2
 0.174 0.172 0.173 0.183 0.179 0.182 
Note. *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. For all regressions, village dummies are included. 
 
 
